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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
While contracting out government services is not a new idea, it has become
the focus of renewed interest in recent years, particularly at the state and
local government levels. Governments are inviting private contractors to
provide services in many areas traditionally served directly by public
employees—examples include prisons and municipal water services. Some
commentators assert that nearly every service performed by state or local
government is being contracted out somewhere. The challenge for
government leaders and the public is how to decide which public services are
appropriate for contracting out and how to ensure that the public is well
served by these contracting decisions.
The City Club directed our committee to review the arguments for and
against contracting out, identify types of services appropriate for contracting
out, examine mechanisms to ensure that the public's goals continue to be met,
and identify criteria to help citizens and public leaders decide when and how
to contract out public services. We focused on state and local government
and did not examine contracting out at the federal level. We did not review
in detail any particular program or jurisdiction but directed our attention to
contracting as a public management strategy.
We found important differences between the cultures and purposes of the
public and private sectors that citizens and decision makers should consider
in contracting decisions. These include the following:
Government is legitimately focused on accountability for financial
assets and has numerous checks both to avoid corruption and to
ensure that funds are spent as directed by the legislative body.
Government accounting systems, therefore, do a better job of tracking how
money is spent rather than providing detailed, service-specific cost
information commonly available in private businesses.
Government is concerned with "fairness"—which in practice often
translates into procedures and processes that demonstrate "equal"
treatment. Often rules that support equal treatment are codified in law and
restrict the latitude of public managers. Government contracts typically
specify what will be done and how, in detail, and vendors compete on price.
The flexibility to negotiate over what service to provide and how is more
characteristic of the private sector than the public sector.
Government is generally risk averse while the private sector is more
supportive of risk taking. The public, news media, or political opposition
are more likely to become irate over failed government strategic decisions or
investments than mere under performance. In many private sector settings,
prudent risk taking is expected and there is greater tolerance for the
inevitable stumbles that come as a result.
Government programs often have multiple objectives. While private
businesses are generally more narrowly focused on maintaining their
financial health, government programs often must serve a variety of
legislatively established public policy objectives—sometimes conflicting
objectives. Public services need to meet these objectives whether a
government provides them in-house or through a contractor.
The reasons for contracting are many, but the predominant rationale is to
save money. Not surprisingly, public managers who have contracted out
services usually report savings. Because many state and local government
services are labor intensive, the source of savings is often the ability of
vendors to manage human resources with greater flexibility. Depending on
the circumstance, this can mean lower wages and benefits, reduced
managerial levels, greater flexibility in work assignment and so forth. Not
surprisingly, public employee unions are among the most likely to be
skeptical about contracting out.
A New Contracting Strategy—Marketization
Although contracting out is not new, the recent push to use this management
tool has led to an entirely new contracting strategy—marketization—which
permits public employees to bid against outside vendors to provide public
services. The focus of the strategy is to harness competitive incentives to
improve the quality and efficiency of public services whether they are
provided in house or by an outside contractor. The City of Indianapolis is the
current "poster city" for marketization. Indianapolis Mayor Stephen
Goldsmith has found that the public workforce, when given a chance and the
flexibility to compete, can often successfully bid against private contractors
and significantly improve service efficiency and quality. A second important
finding from the Indianapolis experience is that even public programs that
appear to be very well run can do better when exposed to competition. It is
not necessary—or desirable— to wait until a program is failing before
considering whether it should be contracted out—or contracted in.
As used in this report, "marketization" means a strategy in which services
are screened in a systematic process to determine whether individual services
should be provided directly by government, contracted out to private
vendors, or "contracted in" to existing employees in competition with outside
vendors.
The Status of Marketization in Oregon
In Oregon, as elsewhere, a great deal of government work is contracted out.
But—with the exception of a modest experiment being considered in the
Portland Water Bureau—we did not find any public executive promoting
marketization. Witnesses were very knowledgeable about contracting and
marketization, but no public manager indicated that engaging the forces of
competition was a front burner issue for them. Typically the decision to
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contract out or bring a contracted service back in house is stimulated by a
problem that needs fixing, not by a commitment to a public management
strategy.
In the 1997 Oregon legislative session, efforts to privatize prisons, DEQ
automobile emissions testing, and some state parks function failed. After the
session, legislators held interim hearings on prison privatization. The 1999
Oregon Legislature is likely to consider a bill to build at least one private
medium security facility. In 2000, voters may have the opportunity to vote on
a proposed state ballot measure that would require government entities to
accept the bid of a vendor that could provide any government service at
savings exceeding 20 percent. This proposed initiative offers a definition of
cost which voters may view as reasonable, but which we believe would drive
up government costs rather than lower them as the initiative's proponents
claim.
Elements of a Successful Marketization Program
Our review of contracting out and marketization in Oregon and around the
country led us to identify certain key elements as essential to the success of
any government contracting/marketization program. These include:
Leadership and Commitment from Political and Executive Leaders. The
implementation of any management strategy—marketization included—
requires leadership and political will. Nothing will happen unless key leaders
want to make it a priority and expend political capital in the pursuit of the
agenda.
An Effective Screening Process: Success requires a jurisdiction to screen all
public services to identify candidates for: (1) contracting out; (2)
marketization, and (3) provision by in-house public sector employees. The
decision not to contract out should be made as thoughtfully as the decision to
contract out. The screening criteria should include:
• Policy vs. Implementation: Activities related to the development of
public policy (e.g., developing laws and regulations, budget development)
are not good candidates for contracting, but a wide range of
implementation activities (e.g., printing, payroll, utilities) should be
considered for contracting. Many jurisdictions distinguish between "core"
services that government should retain an ability to perform (and therefore
could be marketized) and ancillary services, where government should be
comfortable relying entirely on the marketplace.
• Competition: Are there three or more prospective private sector bidders?
Can the work be structured and can contracts be written that will nurture
and maintain competitive incentives?
• Cost: Is the fully allocated cost of the service 110 percent or more of the
price charged by vendors? The fully allocated cost is used for identifying
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candidate services for further analysis. "Avoided cost"—never higher than
the fully allocated cost and generally lower—is used for making a final
decision to contract or not.
• Ability to Evaluate Performance: It is easier to contract for services
where it is possible to evaluate the success of the contractor. Contracting is
difficult when it is not possible to define successful performance in writing
or to recognize it when it occurs.
Information on the Cost of Providing Public Services: Public managers
and decision makers need to have access to accurate information on what it
costs to provide public services. Most jurisdictions have a hard time
determining their own service costs, because government accounting systems
have been designed with other legitimate objectives in mind. Public managers
need to know the fully allocated costs of services (the direct program cost
plus the cost of related general support services) as well as the "avoided
cost" (the true savings of contracting out versus providing a service in
house). It is the avoided cost, not the fully allocated cost, which vendors must
beat in order to save the government money.
Involvement of the Public Workforce: Where marketization has worked
best, governments and contractors have been careful to protect the jobs and
careers of existing government employees. Contractors sometimes hire
government employees, and additional government positions are eliminated
through normal attrition. Where marketization strategies bring employees
completely into the process, they often lead the way in restructuring work
and organization to make themselves more competitive than outside vendors
The lesson is that management should focus on incentives—not on
contracting per se. With proper incentives and given the flexibility to modify
organization and work practices, public employees can reduce costs and
improve performance.
Effective contract negotiation and management: The success of
contracting often depends on the quality of the contracting process and the
contract itself. Governments that contract out must trade in their skills as
direct program managers and instead become skilled contract negotiators
and contract managers. Good contract negotiation and management includes
the following elements: (1) Be clear on outcomes; (2) Tie payments and other
incentives to performance; (3) Acknowledge that contracts can fail and be
prepared to resolve a failure; (4) Acknowledge that conditions may change
and be prepared to respond to changes; (5) Protect public policy preferences;
(6) Have the capacity to monitor and evaluate performance; (7) Nurture
competitive incentives; (8) Make public contract management be as efficient
as possible; and (9) Negotiate rather than specify means and ends when
possible to tap vendor creativity.
Privatization of Government Services _ ..
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDAIONS
Contracting out and marketization are powerful strategies for reducing
government costs. While most, if not all, Oregon jurisdictions use outside
contractors to provide some public services, Oregon jurisdictions lag behind
in the adoption of marketization strategies. We therefore recommend that:
All Oregon public policy decision makers and political leaders should
actively examine how marketization policies could most effectively be used
in their jurisdiction.
Government marketization policies should have the following fundamental
features:
• Screening criteria and a systematic screening process to identify which
services should be provided by government in the traditional way, which
services are candidates for marketization, and which services should be
contracted out.
• Employee involvement to give employees the incentives and flexibility to
show what they can do.
• Accounting systems that are modified, as resources realistically permit, to
provide reliable, fully-allocated cost information.
• Training and analytical assistance for public managers that helps them
make well-founded decisions concerning services to provide in the
traditional manner, services to contract out and services to marketize.
• The use of "avoided costs"—not total or "fully allocated" costs—as the
basis for analyzing contractor bids.
• Implementation that is strategic—picking easier opportunities first and
allowing time to learn from mistakes that may occur.
• Monitoring and evaluation procedures to confirm that the marketization
strategy is producing results.
Areas worthy of further study:
While we did not make any particular program or jurisdiction the focus of
our study, we did become sufficiently familiar with two program areas—
state prisons and county social services programs—to conclude that more
extensive examination by the City Club would be useful.
The City Club should study the specific issue of private prisons for Oregon.
Although a number of private prisons are operating in the United States,
there are none in Oregon. The state is likely to require additional prison
capacity in the future. We believe the question is ripe in Oregon and that a
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focused City Club study would contribute to the public policy discussion.
The City Club would perform a useful service by keeping the focus on
contracting and marketization strategies regardless of the final conclusions
and recommendations of such a report.
The City Club should also consider a study to evaluate Multnomah County's
strategies for the management of not-for-profit social service contractors: We
believe Multnomah County's very large and diverse community of 300 not-
for-profit social service contractors invites a study to recommend the
appropriate management strategy for this program area. Some public officials
took comfort in the idea that goals of non-profit contractors and the goals of
government were sufficiently congruent to make close supervision
unnecessary. We are not comfortable with this notion. While the literature,
and our assessment, suggests that this is not an area of government where
contracting out or marketization is likely to generate any useful competitive
incentives, management of these programs presents an interesting challenge.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Charge: What this report is about.
All levels of government—federal, state, and local—are under pressure to
provide more cost effective services with fewer dollars. Taxpayers are now
less willing to pay for government services than anytime in the recent past.
Oregon's tax limiting measures of recent years reflect citizen concern with the
cost of government.
The prescription many suggest is "privatization:" letting the private sector do
the work now done by government. Privatization takes many forms.
Deregulation of the airlines twenty years ago or of utilities today is a form of
privatization. The creation of public corporations such as the Oregon Health
Sciences University is a form of privatization. School voucher programs are a
version of privatization. But the most prevalent form of privatization is
simply "contracting out" the public's work to the private for-profit or non-
profit sectors. Although each of the many aspects of privatization is worthy
of study, the City Club Research Board charged this committee with an
examination of "contracting out" because it represents a more immediate set
of concerns. State legislators have expressed significant interest in having
private vendors operate state prisons and proposals to privatize the
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) vehicle inspections have been
discussed. An initiative petition to require contracting out was circulated last
year and did not qualify, but has been filed again for the November 2000
election.
The City Club directed this Committee to examine the cases for and against
contracting out; to describe the appropriate criteria for contracting out
government work; to identify the types of services or programs that would be
appropriate to contract out, and to identify and explore other relevant issues.
We were asked to focus on state and local government and did not examine
contracting out at the federal level.
B What we did.
We interviewed representatives of the state, the legislature, Metro,
Multnomah, Washington, and Clackamas Counties, the City of Portland,
public employee unions, the Portland-based Cascade Policy Institute, and
Oregon private contractors to gain an understanding of what is happening in
Oregon. We also read widely in the literature and interviewed
representatives of the City of Indianapolis, the United Water Company, and
the Los Angeles-based Reason Foundation, entities noted for their advocacy
and successful use of privatization. We did not evaluate the performance of
any particular government agency or jurisdiction nor did we study any
particular program or service to determine whether or not it was appropriate
to contract out. A list of interviewees and a bibliography of sources appears
in Appendices A and B.
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C. Report Structure.
This report begins with background on important current trends in
contracting out and a summary of the major arguments of privatization
proponents and opponents. We then identify key criteria for success for
contracting out government services, and describe privatization issues in
different areas of public services. The report closes with the committee's
conclusions and recommendations.
II. BACKGROUND
The following sections offer an overview of the history and current trends
related to contracting out government services.
A. Contracting out is not a new idea.
Government contracting out is as old as the republic—older in fact. George
Washington complained about waste, fraud, and abuse in defense contracts
before the end of the Revolutionary War. Naval privateers—non-
governmental agents—took in customs duties for a commission. The original
Secret Service was the Pinkerton Detective Agency. Although the tide has run
both ways, with government sometimes pulling services in house in response
to failures of the market, government reliance on private contractors has
always been a common dimension of many federal, state, and local programs.
This report is not a history of public contracting. Instead, our focus has been
narrower. We have focused on new thinking about the old idea of contracting
for public services.
B. Contracting out is receiving renewed emphasis,
particularly at the state and local government levels.
At the federal level, privatization initiatives have been driven largely by
policy preferences and ideology. At the state and local level they have been
more often spurred by expediency. Over the last three decades, squeezed by
demands of constituents on the one hand and declining federal assistance
and tax protests on the other, state and local officials have looked more
frequently to contracting as a way to control costs. Controlling cost is the
primary reason given by witnesses for contracting out at the state and local
level.
In 1997, a Council of State Governments survey found that 58.6 percent of
states reported an expansion of privatization activities (in this context,
"contracting out" public services) in the previous five years. Only one state
reported a reduced reliance on private vendors during that time. A survey of
state budget directors, auditors, or controllers found that 68.6 percent believe
the next few years will bring increased privatization. Across the country, 73
percent of local governments use private janitorial services and 54 percent
use private garbage collectors—up from 52 percent and 30 percent,
respectively, a decade ago, according to a survey by Mercer Group, an
Atlanta consulting firm.
The private market currently enjoys a good reputation. Internationally most
of the world's planned economies are en route to, or are being redesigned
with, free market architecture. Democratic capitalism is on the rise.
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In our own country, deregulation of telephone and electric utilities continues.
The 1990 Clean Air Act stepped back from command and control regulation
to grant tradable emissions permits. In 1992, a Democratic President led the
fight for the North American Free Trade Agreement, and in 1996, he
announced "the end of big government." Both parties agree on a balanced
budget. In this context, contracting out is not the partisan issue it once was.
The emphasis now is more often on doing it right than on whether it should
be considered at all.
C. Profit-making companies are now moving into many
areas thought to be the preserve of government.
The municipal water and waste water treatment markets have attracted huge
international companies such as United Water Services which are competing
aggressively by offering contracts to municipalities that guarantee savings of
as much as 50 percent. One in eight community hospital beds is now in a
private hospital. Thirty-seven states now have at least one for-profit prison.
Michigan has privatized foster care and adoption placement services. In New
York, the private non-profit Bryant Park Restoration Corporation renovated
and operates a public park on a 15-year lease. Rancho Palos Verdes,
California contracts out the functions of its prosecutor. A private company
runs air traffic control in Farmington, New Mexico. John Donahue, in The
Privatization Decision, reports one Dallas suburb with 2,500 citizens that has
no city workforce at all except for a secretary to handle the contracts that
constitute the town's public sector. Donahue reports that nearly every
function of local government has been delegated to the private sector at some
time, in some city.
However, even as privatization gains popularity, there are reasons to regard
it with caution. In 1997, a Wall Street Journal article documenting the
privatization of America observed, "...[h]ere in the U.S., still the cutting edge
of capitalism, the early stirrings of backlash against the market are in
sight....As market forces push into new frontiers, Americans wonder: Where
should the line be drawn?" The Wall Street Journal illustrated this observation
with the story of a community that had satisfactory private ambulance
services but balked at having the same company provide fire protection. For
this community, retaining direct control proved more important than the
potential economies involved.
D. The push to contract out has led to a new public
management strategy—"marketization."
Historically, the decision to contract out (or to retrieve a service that has
already been contracted out) has been stimulated by a performance failure, a
budget crisis, a need to raise fees or some other specific stimulus. Generally,
it has been the manager with the problem who looks to contracting out as a
potential solution when "something is broken."
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Today, however, a growing handful of governments have made a new
approach to contracting a jurisdiction-wide policy. Their motivation is to use
the incentives created by competition to encourage economy and
performance whether the work is ultimately done outside by vendors or
inside by an efficient government workforce. Indianapolis and Phoenix are
examples of jurisdictions where public policy requires the consideration of
contracting whether or not "something is broken."
Proponents of top-down, jurisdiction-wide contracting out policies were
quick to understand that working with the existing public sector workforce
could actually be the best solution if that workforce was permitted to use its
expertise and if there was a management decision to support eliminating
political, regulatory, or personnel-oriented internal obstructions. In addition,
in many jurisdictions, law or union agreements require union consultation
and prohibit firings if work is contracted out. These realities have led to
opening the bidding on work to the existing public workforce as well as to
outside contractors. This strategy is called marketization.
The focus of marketization is not on contracting per se, but on using
competition to create incentives to get the work done more efficiently
whether it is performed by outside vendors or by government employees.
The work can be contracted out—or contracted in. Our witnesses and the
literature all made it clear that competition is the key to assuring the highest
value for the lowest cost.
In brief, three steps are involved in marketization:
Step One: Screen services in a systematic process to determine whether
individual services are candidates to be provided directly by government,
contracted out to private vendors, or "contracted in" to existing employees in
competition with outside vendors.
Step Two: Establish costs for services so managers can see how their costs
compare with non-profit or private providers, or even with other similarly-
situated government providers. Just having this information can be powerful.
Step Three: Ensure that the work gets done by the most effective provider.
The provider could be a for-profit or non-profit entity or it could be—and
often is—a government agency that has modified its practices to meet the
competition. Services should be periodically rebid to ensure that the work
continues to be done by the most effective provider.
Proponents say, "structure the incentives correctly, and the people who know
the work best—government employees included—will find ways to do it
better." They point to examples in which auditors or consultants could not
identify savings which were later realized by the workforce itself—given
proper support and incentives.
As used in this report, "marketization" means a strategy in which services
are screened in a systematic process to determine whether individual services
should be provided directly by government, contracted out to private
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vendors, or "contracted in" to existing employees in competition with outside
vendors. (Government employees bid on work being done for the
government—not in competition with private vendors for the business of
other non-governmental clients.)
E. Indianapolis—The "poster city" for marketization.
Currently, Indianapolis is regarded as a pioneer in establishing a successful
jurisdiction-wide marketization strategy. The effort to privatize government
services in Indianapolis began in 1992 with the election of Stephen Goldsmith
as mayor. Goldsmith campaigned for office on a platform to privatize many
city services. Once in office he acted quickly to turn campaign rhetoric into
public policy. But when confronted with the practical issues of
implementation, Goldsmith's strategy evolved from one of privatization to
one of marketization in which public employees can bid against outside
vendors. This compromise brought peace with the public employee unions
and excellent results.
At the time Goldsmith was elected, 25 garbage collection districts were
allocated among Department of Public Works (DPW) crews and four contract
haulers. DPW had franchise agreements with the various trash haulers that
gave each a monopoly in its own area. Not surprisingly, haulers' prices
increased every year.
When the time came to renew hauler contracts in 1993, the City reduced the
number of districts from 25 to 11 and bid them out. DPW was guaranteed
one district so that the City could retain the ability to collect trash if problems
arose. Any one collector was limited to three districts to prevent monopolistic
situations and predatory pricing.
Empowered and cost conscious, City crews won the maximum allowable
three districts. Competition for trash collection resulted in more that $15
million dollars in savings over the following three years.
The unions, early critics of the Goldsmith strategy, have become strongly
supportive. No union member has been laid off during the Goldsmith
administration and, according to local union president Steven Quick, "City
workers are no longer asked to park their brains at the door when coming to
work." The Indianapolis contracting strategy has created incentives for
government employees to restructure the way work is done and how the
government is organized to do it.
Indianapolis has also discovered that changed incentives may produce
savings even in well-run operations. When Goldsmith looked to privatize the
Indianapolis Water Treatment Facility, the opposition of elected local officials
as well as the unions prompted the Mayor's Office to hire an outside
accounting firm to perform an audit of the Water Treatment Facility. The
audit showed that among publicly-run water treatment facilities, Indianapolis
was among the best run in the nation. Notwithstanding that the audit
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suggested that there were no great opportunities for savings, the Mayor
decided to allow any entity to compete for the job of running the facility,
including the current government employees. The result was a contract from
a private-sector entity that resulted in a 44-percent saving over five years—
with the savings passed on to consumers.
Overall, Indianapolis reports that these efforts have been a financial and
service-level success. So far, over 70 municipal services have been opened to
competitive bidding. Between 1993 and 1997, Indianapolis has reduced its
operating budget by seven percent, cut taxes twice, reduced non-public safety
workforce personnel by 40 percent (through early retirement and natural
attrition). These savings, in addition to being returned to the taxpayers, have
been invested in increases in public safety budgets and service-level increases
in public goods such as parks and community recreation facilities.
To assess the ripeness of any particular public activity for marketization,
Indianapolis analysts use a preliminary screen that evaluates the activity as to
whether it is a "core" or "ancillary" service on the one hand and whether it is
"policy making" or "implementation" on the other. See the resulting four
quadrant grid in Exhibit I below. Activities in quadrant IV are good
candidates for simply contracting out. Activities in quadrant III, non-policy
core services, are prospects for having government employees bid against
outside vendors. Activities in quadrants I and II are not as likely to be good
marketization candidates. Of course other considerations must be taken into
account in making final decisions concerning contracting, but the grid helps
get the analytical process going.
Exhibit 1.
Quadrant 1
Courts
Garbage
Collection
Quadrant III
Police
Crack
Sealing
Po icy
Quadrant II
Budgeting
Personnel
Printing
Microfilm
Archives
Quadrant IV
Implementation
Source: Office of the Mayor, Indianapolis, Indiana
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Because good cost information is the essential foundation of a marketization
strategy, Indianapolis also created and implemented a new activity-based
costing system to help managers understand the cost of all government
services.
F. Cultural differences between public and private entities.
It is useful in a discussion of contracting to understand how contracting fits
into the culture of government. Contracting is not about turning over
responsibility for services to the private sector—government remains
responsible to see that the services are provided. The discussion is always
about government and whether it should do its work directly or through
others.
Some witnesses viewed contracting as a way to selectively gain relief from
some of government's legal or cultural characteristics. Others believe a
contracting out or marketization strategy creates incentives to change
government itself. But others cautioned realism concerning just how many of
government's characteristics could or should be changed or avoided by
contracting.
Four basic themes rose from our interviews and research—these are general
observations and do not apply to all public agencies or private businesses:
Government is legitimately focused on accountability for financial
assets and has numerous checks both to avoid corruption and to
ensure that funds are spent as directed by the legislative body.
Public budgets are major instruments of policy and legislative control.
Accounting systems carefully relate funds to the programs for which they
were appropriated. Since governments do not need to price most services,
the detailed, service-specific, cost information that is common in most private
businesses is often unavailable. Government managers may know the cost of
an entire program like road maintenance, but not the cost of filling a pothole.
The differences between government and business are hardly surprising.
Each is focused on its source of revenue. Business must correctly price its
products and services in the market. Government managers must present
information to legislatures that concern themselves more with establishing
the direction in which the government should go than with the management
strategies for getting there. The bottom line is that the cost information
needed to make intelligent contracting decisions may be difficult to assemble
both because accounting systems do not routinely produce it and because
government managers may not always be familiar with the appropriate
costing methods. We discuss costing issues at greater length later in this
report.
Government is concerned with "fairness"—which in practice often
translates into "equal" treatment. As a result, government has a strong
focus on procedures and processes that demonstrate equal treatment.
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Often the rules that support equal treatment are codified in law and restrict
the latitude of public sector managers. In contrast, most private businesses do
not have to serve "all comers" and they often try to give tailored "unequal"
treatment to customers, to make each one feel special. In contracting, it is
typical for government to specify what will be done and often how it will be
done, in detail. Vendors are invited to compete on price only. The idea that
vendors might negotiate the "what" and the "how" as well as price invites
charges of unequal treatment and is, therefore, less common in government
than in the private sector.
Government is risk averse and the private sector is more supportive of
risk taking. This is not surprising given the nature of politics in which
government has its roots. Failed strategic decisions or investments are more
likely than mere underperformance to invite public ire or the attention of the
media or political opposition. In many private sector settings prudent risk
taking is expected and there is greater tolerance for the inevitable stumbles
that come as a result.
Frequently, government programs have multiple objectives. Sometimes
they are the result of legislative compromise that may not fit well together. In
contrast, private businesses are generally more narrowly focused on
maintaining financial health. Whether it contracts or not, government must
still pay attention to its other objectives, such as the protection of individual
rights. Sometimes contracting will give government a more narrow focus
than it wants. For example, it may be cheaper to contract out prison food
services than provide them in house. However, food quality is an important
factor in managing prison populations. If contracting out leads to lower food
quality, the broader tasks of managing inmate morale and prison security
may be made more difficult. Money saved in the kitchen may be lost many
times over elsewhere in the prison. However, we do not imply that the
lowest cost provider will always lead to the lowest quality service, just as a
high-cost provider does not necessarily always provide superior quality
service.
In summary, contracting does not buy government managers an exemption
from: the demands for asset accountability; the protection of individual
rights; requirements for demonstrable fairness; the political and media
oversight that makes risk aversion rational behavior; or the burden of
multiple and sometimes conflicting objectives. The government can be better.
Government cannot be private business. Contracting out will not, and should
not, make government function like business.
G. Marketization isn't a passion among Oregon's leaders.
We did find many Oregon government witnesses knowledgeable about
marketization strategies being employed elsewhere. In fact, much of the
business of the state and local government is already performed by
contractors. But in general, case-by-case pragmatism appears to be the rule.
Where something is not going well, consideration is given to contracting it
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out—or bringing it back in house. We did not find a great deal of interest in
marketization strategies, in which government workers and outside vendors
compete for the same work.
Washington County is one jurisdiction we encountered which has a stated
philosophy on contracting out. Its "County 2000 Strategic Plan" states,
"Every effort will be made to purchase those services which can be more
effectively provided by the private sector or other community organizations
through contractual agreements or grants to these providers." Although there
is no formal county-wide framework for evaluating whether or not to
contract out any specific service, the county, in fact, contracts for more than
200 services on an ongoing basis. Attention is given to costs, the capacity and
expertise of vendors, convenience and internal workloads. There are no
formal guidelines. Contracting out has been rejected for some road
maintenance tasks even where outside vendors exist. And some work—
groundskeeping, electrical maintenance, computer support, and housing
maintenance for example—which had been contracted out, has been brought
back in-house.
The Portland Water Bureau has cautiously considered testing a marketization
approach that would let employees bid on some work traditionally
contracted out and let contractors bid on some work traditionally done
internally. This was the only consideration of marketization we encountered
in Oregon.
The Portland Bureau of General Services puts itself in the marketplace by
being a major contractor to other governments for printing and
communications services, which it provides at competitive prices (though its
administrator acknowledges he probably would not have taken on in-house
printing had it not already been a function of the bureau when he took over).
The Bureau manager believes being a provider in even this somewhat limited
market helps him evaluate performance and use competition to discipline his
internal costs.
But efforts to privatize prisons, DEQ automobile emissions testing, and some
state park functions foundered during the 1997 session of the legislature.
Interim hearings have been held on prison privatization, and it is likely that a
bill will be introduced in the 1999 legislative session to build at least one
private medium security facility.
A ballot initiative to compel contracting out was circulated but failed to
qualify for the November 1998 ballot. A new version of that proposed
measure, entitled "The Efficiency in Government Act," has been filed for the
November 2000 election.
We met many public managers, several of whom were quite impressive, but
among them we did not find a champion like Indianapolis Mayor Goldsmith
promoting jurisdiction-wide marketization. In general, witnesses described
contracting out in Oregon as occurring in response to very specific problems
facing particular programs recently or in the historic past, and not driven by
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a strong philosophical preference or strategy of public management.
A 1997 survey of state officials by the Council of State Governments found
respondents in the western United States reporting more modest benefits
from privatization (in this context, contracting out) than respondents in other
regions of the country. For example, 8.3 percent of respondents in the west
reported that privatization efforts had resulted in savings greater than 15
percent. In the east, 18.5 percent of respondents reported savings greater than
fifteen percent. In the South 19.8 percent reported savings of this magnitude.
It may be that the savings opportunities—real or perceived—are not as
compelling in our region as elsewhere.
We did find, as appears common in many other jurisdictions, a strong dose of
criticism, if not outright opposition, from public employee labor
organizations to more contracting out. But, with few exceptions, witnesses
are prepared to leave what is alone. Accordingly, there are some jurisdictions
that find themselves relying extensively on contractors for certain services,
while nearby jurisdictions perform the same services in-house. But unless
something is clearly not working, the inclination of decision makers, public
managers, and unions in Oregon appears to be: leave the status quo alone.
PROS AND CONS—
THE ARGUMENTS WE HEARD OR READ ABOUT
FOR AND AGAINST CONTRACTING OUT.
A. Pros—the principal arguments for contracting out.
Cost Savings: Because state and local officials choose to contract out
primarily to save money, it is no surprise that they report getting what they
are looking for: savings. Proponents are armed with specific examples where
contracting out strategies worked; opponents have case studies to prove that
sometimes contracting out does not work. In general, surveys of public
officials and studies report savings.
In 1987, Touche Ross and Company surveyed cities and counties concerning
18 different local services, from snow removal and streetlight maintenance to
running day care centers. Most reported cost savings in the range of 10 to 20
percent. Two-fifths reported savings in excess of 20 percent and one tenth of
the respondents reported savings of 40 percent or more.
How do contractors do it? Researcher Donald Kettl concluded that "private
contractors improve efficiency through more flexible use of labor, a richer
array of incentives and penalties and often, a more precise allocation of
accountability."
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III.
Privatization of Government Services Pros and Cons
A study performed by economist Barbara Stevens, for the Department of
Housing and Urban Development in the five counties of the Los Angeles
metropolitan area, highlights differences between contractors and
government in the management of people. She studied 121 different units of
local government, delivering 38 different services, either directly or by
contract.
The results: For every service except payroll preparation, Stevens found large
and statistically-reliable cost advantages for private contractors. While
quality of service did differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, quality
differences did not correlate either with total cost of service or with whether
contractors or governments provided the service.
Exhibit II below illustrates how agencies and contractors differ in workforce
characteristics and workforce management.
Exhibit II.
Share of direct labor in total cost
Workforce unionized
Average age of workers
Average job tenure (in years)
Vacation days per worker
Average absenteeism (all reasons)
Management layers above laborers
Foreman can fire workers
Written worker reprimands used
Employee incentive systems
Workers maintain own equipment
Cities Using
Private
Contractors(by percent)
49.0
20.0
32.1
5.80
10.1
8.80
1.50
53.7
33.8
26.9
92.5
Cities Using
Private
Contractors(by percent)
60.2
48.1
36.1
8.10
14.0
12.9
1.90
16.0
72.5
12.3
48.1
Source: Barbara J. Stevens ed. Delivering Municipal Services Efficiently (Washington HUD
Office of Policy Development and Research 1984), pp. 18-19, ex. 10.
Not surprisingly, the different management approaches contractors and
governments take toward their workforce can drive very significant cost
differences for most services.
But it is not just the way service employees are managed. Pay and benefits
are also different. For six of the seven services for which Stevens collected
usable wage information, contractor employees were also paid less than
municipal employees according to John Donahue, author of
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The Privatization Decision. "A good deal of what taxpayers stand to gain from
privatization comes at the expense of municipal employees," according to
Donahue.
Access to expertise or special capacity: A good reason to contract is to
obtain expertise you may lack. For example, a school board, which views
itself as being in the education business, might choose to contract for food
service, an area where it lacks expertise or focus. Private vendors in the water
and wastewater treatment areas claim expertise born of experience running
dozens of systems. One successful vendor in the municipal water market told
us, "We have more Ph.D. engineers than most cities have employees."
Economies of scale favor some contractors who serve many jurisdictions.
And of course there are consultants who do things routinely, say
compensation studies, that a government does only once in a while.
Flexibility: Private contractors can often implement programs more rapidly,
and can be laid off more conveniently when programs shrink. It is not
unusual for governments to repair and maintain roads themselves but to
draw on contractors for major construction that comes and goes. There is, for
example, no building construction department in any Oregon government.
And the Oregon State motor pool, which routinely changes oil for its fleet,
looks to outside contractors when transmissions need repair.
Marketization—bringing the incentives of the competitive market to
the workplace: Indianapolis Mayor Stephen Goldsmith says "Public
employees are an easy scapegoat. . . When union workers are given the
freedom to put their own ideas into action, they can be as innovative,
effective, and cost conscious as their private sector counterparts—and they
can prove it in the marketplace."
Letting outside vendors and government employees bid brings the
competitive incentives of the market to bear, no matter who ends up doing
the work.
Governmental bodies have difficulty implementing many of the incentives
that work in other sectors: we found few pay-for-performance and bonus
programs and heard of several that withered under political criticism. It is
difficult to convince the public that government employees should get
"extras" just for doing their jobs well. In contrast, the incentives created by
"marketization" strategies seem to pass muster politically, making
"marketization" an even more valuable tool than would otherwise be the
case.
Selective suspension of government rules: Generations of legislatures
have layered on rules to make government accountable and fair but the result
is not always efficient or effective government. Proponents of contracting out
argue that contracting out permits government to selectively suspend its own
rules to improve efficiency or effectiveness. For example, a government that
has tangled procurement regulations might contract out work to a contractor
who is unencumbered by government purchasing restrictions.
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B. Cons—The principal arguments against contracting out.
Cost Savings: In some cases governments have strong competitive
advantages. They don't need to make a profit, and they pay no taxes. In the
case of construction programs, governments generally pay lower workers'
compensation rates than private construction contractors. The government's
rate is calculated based on the entire government workforce. Much of this
workforce is usually made up of clerical workers and other workers who face
little risk of on-site injuries.
Government generally enjoys significant limits on tort liability that are not
available to private sector contractors. In Oregon, government liability is
limited to: $100,000 per person with a $300,000 limit per incident, punitive
damages are not allowed, and claims must be filed within six-months of the
incident. Private sector contractors have unlimited liability, are subject to
punitive damages, and claims can be filed up to two years after an incident.
This disparity may give some governments a cost advantage over private
contractors, although private prison contractors say their greater liability
exposure simply makes them more sensitive to doing the job right in the first
place.
Government may indeed be the low-cost alternative, or at least no more
costly than the private sector, if the only private sector alternative for a
service is a single vendor in a monopoly position. The vendor's monopoly
position shields it from the incentives of a competitive market. It is these
incentives that usually generate cost savings.
Where program objectives are complex and possibly inconsistent, and where
process and fairness are important, the government's high contract-
preparation and monitoring costs will erode—and may cancel out—any
savings generated by using an outside vendor.
Focus on costs to the exclusion of other legitimate public objectives:
Where end products are easy to define—transmission repair or janitorial
services, for example—and results are easy to measure, contracting out may
be appropriate. But legislatures have given most government programs
multiple objectives, and some are defined more by process than by output.
The Wall Street Journal, certainly a friend of businesslike approaches to
government management, bridled at the suggestion that collection costs be
given priority at the Internal Revenue Service where fairness and due process
are more important to that newspaper's constituency than the efficiency of
agency operations.
But even where services lend themselves to contracting out, some
governments choose to do the work themselves: At one point, Metro chose to
save money by contracting for security services at the Zoo and at Metro
headquarters. The contract security force turned over frequently and did not
integrate well with the rest of Metro's workforce or relate knowledgeably to
the public on non-security issues. Metro decided to bring this service in-
house again, despite a somewhat higher cost. The Oregon Department of
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Corrections (ODC) found private food service contractors to be cheaper, but
insufficiently sensitive to the importance of satisfactory food to prison morale
and safety. ODC also decided to go back to providing food services in-house
to achieve better integration with their overall program.
Loss of Control: This was the concern we heard most frequently from
witnesses. The more complex the service, the more a service requires
managers to fill in the details with in-process judgments, the more managers
agonize about how to control programs through contracts.
Ironically, where the vendors were non-profits—as in Multnomah County
where county human services are provided by over three hundred highly-
specialized, non-profit contractors—some public sector managers are
comfortable with very limited control, relying largely on the motivations of
the non-profit service providers to see that a good job is done at a reasonable
price.
Impact on workers: People represent over 50 percent of state and local
government costs, so cost savings are likely to come at the expense of jobs,
wages, or benefits. One senior official interviewed resisted contracting out
because of a belief that it should not be government policy to replace higher
paying jobs with lower paying employment in the private sector. Not
surprisingly, the greatest skepticism concerning contracting out came from
the labor union representatives interviewed.
Some witnesses emphasized that government has a legitimate role in
providing employment to many who would have difficulty elsewhere—
employment in government has been an important pathway to the
mainstream economy for waves of immigrants and minorities. To insist that
nothing matters in public service delivery but the raw dollar cost is to adopt
a needlessly narrow view of government, they noted.
Contracting out jeopardizes other approaches to good management:
Some we spoke with pointed out that marketization or contracting out were
not the only pathways to good management. A willingness to contract out
services traditionally done by government could create morale problems
which would undermine otherwise satisfactory management approaches.
Even proponents of contracting out and marketization caution that no-layoff
policies and workforce involvement are important to ensure success of any
strategy to expand contracting out.
Excessive profits: There is a sensitivity—we encountered in interviews and
in the general literature—concerning high salaries and large profits per se as
inappropriate, particularly in human services programs, which are perceived
to be underfunded. "Why should money that would be better spent on
recipients line the pockets of private entrepreneurs?" is the question asked.
The perception that some contractors—profit and non-profit—are enriched at
the expense of needy people does not sit well with many citizens. Some states
do not permit for-profit entities to bid on human services work for this
reason.
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Contractors play politics: As much as private entities extol competition,
many expend a great deal of energy to sidestep it. It is not uncommon for
contractors to lobby, mount public relations campaigns or make political
contributions, or propose or support legislation—all legal activities—to
influence government outside the bidding process. (Of course, public
employee unions often use the same political tools to pursue their interests
and protect public sector jobs.)
Historically, many services came to be performed by the government directly
because reliance on contractors had created fertile ground for corruption.
New York City created its street cleaning department after decades of failure
by corrupt contractors and public managers. It is no accident that many
services are performed by politically insulated civil service employees rather
than contractors who are more likely to play politics and, in the extreme case,
buy favor illegally. It is not surprising that government procurement and
management practices tend toward risk aversion, cumbersome process and
fairness at the expense of—critics say—economy and results. We were
cautioned not to walk away from the existing system without understanding
the legitimate values it was created to protect.
Competition may be a fiction: Even relationships that begin with the
competitive selection of a vendor can migrate toward monopoly once the
contract is signed. If a jurisdiction loses its ability to do a certain kind of
work, it is no longer able to compete prospectively with its own vendor. We
heard, for example, that asphalt prices rose sharply when the City of Portland
closed its own asphalt plant some years ago. The price provided to the City
by asphalt contractors was more than what was available when the City ran
its own plant.
And if critical assets, e.g., water works, fire equipment or even school buses,
are owned by the vendor—competition may provide no protection because
the government may be able to sever its ties to the vendor only at the high
cost of replacing assets. Contracting out may be straightforward, but creating
and maintaining competitive incentives is more problematic.
Contracting out is often just a way to side step regulations government
created with a good reason in mind: Contractors are not bound by all the
rules restricting government, but this is not good news to everybody. Using
contracts to get out from under government personnel, procurement, or other
rules is not good news to constituencies that fought to get the government to
impose the rules on itself in the first place.
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IV. Gett ing it Right—FINDINGS ON HOW TO
SUCCEED.
Done right, contracting out and marketization strategies produce benefits
including cost savings. But it isn't automatic. This chapter addresses our
findings concerning "getting it right."
A. Criteria for selecting services appropriate for contracting
out, as suggested by witnesses and by the literature.
Policy or Implementation. Is the work policy-making or implementation?
No one we interviewed challenges the idea that "policy making" belongs to
government. Of course government should "steer the boat," but activities
that implement established policy are candidates for contracting out or for
marketization, in which government employees also bid on the work.
In many cases, the distinction between policy and implementation is
straightforward: the decision to keep certain streets clear of snow is policy;
clearing the snow is implementation. But when a police officer or welfare
caseworker makes a discretionary decision concerning a member of the
public, is that "policy" or "implementation"? In some programs, policy
making is embedded in day-to-day implementation.
Before exempting a program from contracting out on the grounds that policy
and implementation are hopelessly commingled, proponents of contracting
out recommend that the tasks the work entails be analyzed to separate
implementation from policy. For example, all would agree that civil courts
deal with "policy," but in Multnomah County much of their work is
successfully diverted to a pre-trial mediation process in which mediators
(unpaid volunteers in Multnomah County) resolve many disputes without
trial. This strategy separates the work that needs to be done by the courts
from that which can be done by a private workforce.
Is the work at the "core" of what government exists to do, or is it
ancillary? "Core" public services are the basic responsibilities for which
government exists. Examples include police, courts, fire protection, garbage
collection, road repair, provision of clean drinking water, and waste water
disposal. Many are reluctant to contract out what are regarded as "core"
services, but some of these (e.g., garbage collection and road repair) have
been contracted out with benefit to the public so long as a government entity
provides oversight. But core services are often excellent candidates for
marketization—in which a government workforce bids against outside
vendors. This is particularly attractive where work can be segmented—
garbage collection would be an example—so that some of the service can be
performed in-house and some can be done by contractors.
Ancillary services, such as printing, janitorial services, and fleet maintenance
are generally viewed as candidates for contracting out. If there is a
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competitive marketplace with multiple vendors interested in bidding on
government work, the contracting out of ancillary services may be very
attractive.
However, what is "core" and what is "ancillary" depends a great deal on the
philosophy and politics of any particular jurisdiction. Scottsdale, Arizona, for
example, has a long-standing contractual relationship with Rural-Metro, Inc.
for the provision of fire services. But most jurisdictions balk at contracting
out for a fire department. The Indianapolis decision grid described earlier in
the report is a good guide that decision makers can use to identify services
that they regard as "policy making or implementation" on the one hand, and
"core and ancillary" on the other.
Proponents encourage analyzing the tasks the function involves to separate
"ancillary" from "core" services. Police patrols might be regarded as
"core"—but servicing police cars may be "ancillary" and a good candidate
for contracting out.
Measurability. How will you know if a vendor does it right? Work that leads
to clearly measurable outputs and where evaluation standards can be
specified in advance is a clear candidate for contracting out: water supply,
garbage pickup, paving, or park maintenance are examples. So called "hard"
services, where it is clear what the product is, lend themselves to either
contracting out or a marketization strategy.
Does the service stand alone? Services that do not involve continuous or
frequent interaction with other activities are excellent candidates for either
contracting out or marketization. Food services in a school may be
sufficiently independent of other activities to make it a candidate for
contracting, but we heard that food quality in a prison affected morale and
security and was not a good candidate for contracting out.
Can the service be segmented? Marketization—where public employees
bid against outside competitors—works particularly well where a service can
be broken up by districts. Phoenix, Arizona has separate competitions in each
of four solid waste districts. Houston, Texas has public/private competition
in one of four solid waste collection districts. These approaches permit
competition, but the cities also retain capability to perform essential public
services.
Has anyone done it before? Services that have been successfully contracted
out—or targeted for public /private competition—are preferable to services
that have not. Fort Lauderdale's decision to experiment with public-private
competition for fleet maintenance services was influenced by the fact that
several other governments in Florida had already broken ground in this area.
Are the markets competitive? Can competition be created and maintained?
If the markets are not competitive, the principal benefit of contracting out,
cost savings, may be unavailable. A private monopolist generally has no
more incentive to be efficient than a public monopolist, witnesses agreed.
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There may be other reasons to contract out, but as a screen to prospect for
opportunities to save money, many suggest, literally, a look in the telephone
Yellow Pages. Services that are likely to generate two—preferably three—
private sector bids are candidates for contracting out or marketization.
Evaluations of contracting efforts in both the United States and the United
Kingdom have found a positive relationship between the use of multi-year
contracts and the level of private sector interests. One of the reasons
suggested is that multi-year contracts allow contractors more time to recover
start-up costs. Accordingly, some commentators would say services for
which multi-year contracts can be awarded are generally better candidates
for contracting than services that can only be purchased on short-term
contracts.
Lawrence Martin, writing in the MIS Report of the International City
Managers Association, suggests that private sector vendors are likely to be
the most competitive when their salary, wage, benefit, sick leave, and
vacation packages are competitive with those of government. He also
suggests that vendors making use of part-time workers are more likely to be
competitive than those that do not.
Government can also create competitive situations where the market has not
provided them. Work can be split between a contractor and a competing
government work force. Or government can make a market where none
exists, using its requests for proposal to stimulate the emergence of new
vendors.
Is the fully allocated cost significantly higher than outside vendors
charge? Where the accounting system produces fully-allocated cost
information, it can be used as part of the preliminary screening process. A
Reason Foundation paper suggests that 110 percent of vendor prices be used
as a preliminary rule of thumb. If the process moves to the point of
contracting out, the "avoided cost"—almost always a lower number than the
"fully allocated cost"—is what the contractor must better, but a high, fully
allocated cost is an invitation for further analysis. (Costing is discussed in
greater detail later in this report.)
Consider the internal market when planning marketization. When
considering contracting out most of the focus is on the external market. But
when considering marketization—where government employees bid on
work—it is necessary to consider internal market conditions as well.
Entrepreneurial management will do better than managers who are
uncomfortable with competition. Giving employees and unions the ability to
influence work rules, process design, and organization is important. In-house
departments will generally be more competitive where salary, wage, and
benefit scales are competitive with those of outside vendors. Departments
that can make use of part-time employees may be more competitive than
those that do not. Activities where there are opportunities for restructuring
or reengineering of service delivery systems are good candidates for
marketization. But because the point of marketization is to bring about
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change that would make in-house units better performers. The fact that they
are not competitive at the outset is no reason to shield them from
marketization. It is, however, a reason to give in-house departments the time
and flexibility they need to become competitive.
Be Strategic: Would successful contracting out or marketization make a
difference? Pick significant targets. Programs where the costs are significant
are candidates; but also programs where the prospects of success are good
regardless of size may be important. A contracting-out or marketization
strategy can benefit from early successes and good examples.
"If it isn't broken, fix it anyway." There is no question that it is easier to
overcome resistance to change when there is general agreement that
"something is broken"—that a program is working poorly or exhibits obvious
opportunities for restructuring that existing management is unable to grasp.
We observed that many contracting decisions are stimulated by a crisis
where something is not going well and a change is needed. But "something is
broken" does not make most criteria lists. This is because proponents of
contracting out and marketization believe it is important to look for
opportunities before "something is broken." While jurisdictions may differ in
how they interpret or weigh criteria, proponents argue that it is important to
have a systematic screening program that looks at all of the programs of a
jurisdiction—the successful and the unsuccessful alike—in a search for
opportunities to bring market incentives to bear. "If it isn't broken, don't fix
it" is not the slogan of contracting out or marketization proponents.
B. A bedrock issue—determining the cost of service.
We found widespread agreement in principle that knowing the costs of
public services is, by itself, important management information even if it does
not lead to contracting out.
Complaints about cost methodology are frequent among the opponents in the
privatization debate. We became quite cautious about accepting at face value
the claims of proponents or opponents concerning costs or savings since a
great deal turns on how government costs its services for comparison with
vendor prices.
Ironically, most government accounting systems make it difficult to know
what a particular service costs. They have been designed with other
legitimate purposes in mind.
Government accounting systems are generally on a "cash" basis because of
the importance of knowing whether current year tax revenues will cover
current year expenditures. Private sector accounting practices are generally
on an "accrual" rather than a "cash" basis, which allocates revenue and
expenditures over multiple periods to more accurately reflect economic
performance.
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The budget in government is an expression of public policy and a principal
instrument for control. Accounting systems are designed to assure legislators
and others that money is spent on the activities for which it was
appropriated. The prevalence of inter-governmental revenues creates a
greater emphasis on dollar tracking as each contributing government wants
to be assured that its funds are spent for the intended purpose. "Fund
accounting," found in the public and non-profit sectors, is an example of a
device frequently used to demonstrate that dollars were spent only on the
appropriate activity.
Since governments do not charge fees for most of their services, there may be
no incentive to routinely allocate overheads to determine what users should
pay to cover the full cost of the service. Since many of government's capital
investments, such as physical structures like City Hall, are not generators of
revenue, what costs should be allocated to what services to get to apples-to-
apples comparisons with private sector prices is often the subject of
legitimate debate.
Providing information on service efforts, costs and the accomplishments of a
government entity is an important objective of financial reporting. But in
practice, most financial systems have given much greater weight to
accountability for dollars and to cash reporting than to cost-of-service
information.
Determining the cost of service is further complicated when a program
receives dollars from multiple funding sources, each concerned that its
dollars get to the right place, and each pleased that its own dollars have
"leveraged" the dollars of others. In this environment it is easy to lose sight
of the overall cost of service.
Of the jurisdictions that have explored service cost, many do so on a special
project basis, because the accounting systems are not designed to make cost
of service self-evident. A number of governments, the City of Portland
among them, have published analytical handbooks to guide the analysis.
Witnesses told us that it is reasonable, given the sophistication of computer
technology, to expect future evolutions of government accounting systems to
become significantly more helpful for the costing of services. While the idea
of having cost-of-service information easily available is widely supported, it
comes at a price. We did not hear calls for the immediate overhaul of
government accounting systems, although jurisdictions such as Indianapolis
have rebuilt systems to support their strong commitments to contracting out.
Indianapolis asked an outside accounting firm to help introduce activity-
based costing into city government. Activity-based costing is an accounting
and financial management tool that identifies costs of city activities and
services on an outcome basis. Direct costs, the depreciation of buildings and
equipment, fixed costs (e.g., idle equipment and building space), and
citywide overhead costs are incorporated into the production costs of a unit
of output. Unlike other cost-estimating methods, activity-based costing
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focuses attention on the cost of producing outputs, as opposed to simply
measuring the inputs (hours, tons, etc.).
The Indianapolis activity-based costing system facilitates contracting out, but
it is also useful for identifying underutilized resources, spotlighting excessive
overhead, and for making comparisons from district to district for the same
services. It also helps front-line workers understand costs and allows them to
make improvement suggestions based on this cost information.
C. Knowing what to do with the numbers when you get
them.
Contractors want a "level playing field," which does not necessarily lead to
the best deal for the taxpayer. Governments do enjoy some cost advantages.
They pay no taxes. They are not required to return a profit. In the case of
construction projects, governments enjoy lower workers' compensation rates
than the construction contractors they might employ. Should the costs be
adjusted to neutralize these cost advantages? Third party observers say
"No." Government and the taxpayers who support it should benefit from the
comparative advantages government does have. Costs are what they are.
The first step in cost analysis is determining the total cost or "fully allocated
cost" of in-house service delivery. This is described by the equation below:
Fully Allocated Cost = Direct Costs + Indirect Costs
Direct costs are those cost items that only benefit the service being analyzed.
Examples are the salaries and wages of the government employees who work
exclusively on providing the service. Some direct costs are less obvious but
must be included as well. The interest costs on capital items used by the
program and pension costs are examples. A depreciation or use allowance
factor should also be computed for facility and capital equipment. Even when
no actual dollar cost is incurred, a use allowance factor should still be
included because the assets—the buildings and equipment—could be used
for other government purposes or sold.
Indirect costs, or overhead, include, for example, a program's share of
accounting, human resources, and other general agency administrative costs.
Depreciation rates in the private sector are shaped by the Tax Code. Private
sector entities have incentives to recover investment costs quickly to generate
cash and depress taxable profits as well as to increase the probability that a
capital asset will be paid for before its "economic life" expires. Public entities
often have no reason to depreciate assets at all and, when they do, may have
incentives to stretch the time period of cost recovery over the "physical life"
of an asset to hold the cost of service down. Because government cannot go
out of business, the case for utilizing a short "economic life" for an asset is
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not as strong as it might be for a private business in a competitive
environment. The fact that government generally does use longer time
periods to depreciate equipment has prompted the Associated General
Contractors in Oregon to propose that equipment "rental" rates be
established by state law.
The next step is to determine the cost of contract service delivery. This is not
the price the contractor bids. Instead, total cost of contract service delivery is
the sum of: (1) the contractor cost; (2) the government's contract
administration cost; (3) amortized costs of converting from in-house to
contract service; (4) minus any new revenues the program might produce.
The equation below illustrates the components of the contract service cost.
Total Contracting Cost = Contractor Cost +
Administration Cost +
Amortized Conversion Costs -
New Revenue
The two major methods for estimating the cost of contract administration are
informed judgment and federal Office of Management and Budget
guidelines. A Reason Foundation policy paper on cost analysis suggests that
contract administration costs are likely to be in the range of 10 to 20 percent
of the contractor costs.
Cost comparisons using the fully-allocated costs of public services are useful
in determining whether the in-house cost of providing a target service is
comparable with private sector market prices. The State of Texas compares
the fully allocated cost of in-house service delivery with private sector prices
on a routine basis. If the fully allocated cost of in-house service delivery is
greater than 110 percent of the prevailing private sector price, the state
agency must reduce its costs or it may be targeted for contracting out.
Fully-allocated costs are helpful in identifying cost reduction opportunities
and identifying services that are candidates for contracting out. But—
according to the Reason Foundation—the use of fully-allocated costs is
generally inappropriate for estimating the savings to be realized by
contracting out. For that, managers must determine the "avoided cost"
associated with contracting. The equation below illustrates the importance of
determining the in-house costs that would not be incurred—would be
avoided—if a target service were to be contracted out:
Savings = Avoided Costs - Total Contracting Cost
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Determining which in-house costs will be avoided is rarely a simple task.
Direct costs will be avoided, of course, but knowing how overhead costs will
change is largely a matter of managerial judgment. Generally three factors
come into play:
• Will power. The extent to which overhead costs will actually be reduced is
a matter of managerial and political will. Incentives to do so are often not
• great.
• Amount of contracting out. Contracting out a small program may not
, impact overheads at all. On the other hand, if a number of small programs
are contracted out it may be easier to reduce costs in government support
departments, such as human resources and payroll.
• Contract length. Many costs are difficult to avoid in the short run, but
may be more easily reduced in the long-term. For example, contracting
out a service in the short run may still leave a jurisdiction holding the lease
for facilities. And in many jurisdictions—including those in Oregon—
contracting out leads to a slow reduction in government positions through
attrition and reassignment. It is a rare government that can or wants to fire
employees displaced by a contracting out strategy. Some tradeoffs exist.
While longer-term contracts permit the government to capture greater
savings as the costs that are actually avoided approach the fully-allocated
costs, longer-term contracts also relieve contractors of some of the
competitive pressures that produce those savings.
When government is contemplating a major expansion of service—rather
than contracting out—some commentators suggest using the fully-allocated
cost of the proposed service to compare with the costs of contract providers.
A business entity intending to take on a new service has the choice to either
provide the service in-house or contract out for it. In a competitive business,
the additional cost (also called "marginal cost") of performing the work in-
house would be compared with the cost of contracting. Lawrence Martin,
writing for the Reason Foundation, suggests that what is a sound practice for
business is not necessarily prudent for governments. This is because, unlike a
business faced with competitive incentives, governments often maintain
excess capacity that tends to make government estimates of the marginal cost
of doing something new unrealistically low.
Useful cost analysis involves a great deal of managerial judgment as well as
the "hard numbers" that fall out of an accounting system. Actually realizing
savings takes political will. Even something as apparently technical as cost
, analysis requires political leadership and motivated public management.
Cost analysis is both the bedrock for contracting out decisions and a
minefield as well.
The Portland Water Bureau, in a test of "contracting in," permitted an in-
house crew to bid on work traditionally done by outside contractors. The in-
house crew won and the Associated General Contractors promptly sought an
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injunction. In spite of the City's effort to appropriately identify and allocate
its indirect costs in the bidding process, AGC does not trust the City's cost
analysis and is concerned that the City uses different standards in
considering inside and outside bids. The AGC intends to take its issues on
cost methodology to the legislature if it cannot reach a negotiated agreement
with the City. City representatives disagree with AGC and believe that the
City properly evaluated its costs.
D. "The Efficiency in Government Act."
The correct perspective for cost analysis is that of the taxpayer. A current
proposed ballot measure offers an interesting illustration of how easy it is to
slip into the seductive embrace of "level playing field" arguments and create
policies that may be fair to contractors, but not to taxpayers. The good
example of this problem is presented by the proposed:, "Efficiency in
Government Act." The measure will appear on the November 2000 Oregon
State ballot if its proponents gather the requisite number of signatures. This
proposed initiative offers a definition of cost which voters may view as
reasonable but which would drive government costs up rather than down as
the initiative's title would suggest. The measure would permit voters to
require a government entity to accept the bid of a vendor that could provide
a service at savings exceeding 20 percent. The measure defines savings
exceeding 20 percent as, " a bid to provide a product or service at a price that
is more than 20 percent less than the cost of the current government provider
including all labor costs including all fringe benefits and actuarial costs of
pension benefits; occupancy costs of all buildings and other real property
using market rental rates; and all taxes, fees, and licenses a private sector
provider would be expected to pay in the same circumstances." Not only
would the measure price government services at their fully-allocated cost
rather than the cost that would actually be avoided by contracting out, but
the fully-allocated cost would be artificially inflated by adding "taxes, fees,
and licenses," which are not part of the government's cost of service. The
playing field might be leveled from the point of view of a prospective outside
vendor, but not from the point of view of the taxpayer who could expect to
pay more for government services rather than less if this measure were
enacted.
Costing is not an issue that policy makers or voters can safely leave to others
to sort out.
E. Involving the existing workforce enhances prospects for
success.
Contracting out threatens existing public employees. Jurisdictions that have
been successful in contracting out generally have worked closely with their
own employees and have "no-fire" rules. Personnel cost savings are achieved
by attrition and reassignment within government and by having the
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contractor hire displaced government employees. We learned that many
private companies now contracting to perform public services employ many
former government employees. The heads of the principal private corrections
corporations are all former public corrections officials.
Not surprisingly, the sensible practice of engaging the existing workforce has
led to permitting employees to bid for work against outside contractors.
Knowing the costs, engaging the employees, and being willing to go outside
if necessary, can stimulate restructuring of work and organization that makes
going outside unnecessary.
In many jurisdictions, law or labor contracts deal explicitly with the rights of
employees where contracting out occurs. Article 13 of the State of Oregon's
collective bargaining agreement with the Oregon Public Employees Union
requires, among other things, that the Union have the opportunity to submit
an alternate proposal, and there are extensive protections for displaced
workers.
F. The contract itself can make or break the strategy.
The success of contracting out is often dependent on the quality of the
contracting process and the contract itself. Governments that contract out
must trade in their skills as direct program managers and instead become
skilled contract negotiators and contract managers. It isn't easy, and
sometimes it can be very difficult.
We heard from witnesses that, because governments often are required to
accept the lowest bid when contracting out, public sector contract negotiators
must do their best to consider, and provide for, all aspects of the product or
service they hope to achieve. Early clarification of needs and desired
outcomes is essential for both the public body and the contractor.
While contract detail, in terms of final product, is useful, some of the
safeguards placed upon the public contracting process can have negative
impacts in terms of contractor participation. We heard from witnesses that
some prospective contractors choose not to do business with the government
at all because the contracting process, the contracts themselves, and the
administration of contracts by government is more tedious and time-
consuming than contractors face with private sector clients. Complex process
cuts off government from some of the talent that is available in the vendor
community.
Typical government contracting practices tend to specify in detail the work to
be done, which permits contractors to differentiate themselves primarily with
respect to price. More open contracting processes—negotiated contracting
processes—may permit contractors to differentiate themselves with respect to
the work method and product as well as price. An open contracting process
taps the talents of the prospective contractors and may help the client
redefine his needs before a contract is written.
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We did learn about one jurisdiction—Atlanta—which had successfully used a
negotiated bidding process in selecting a municipal water system operator. A
first round of bidding was used to identify vendors with acceptable prices; a
second round—in which every vendor could see every other vendor's
proposal—opened the door to negotiation on what would be done and how.
But Atlanta appears to be an exception to the rule. Most public jurisdictions,
including those in Oregon, require public agencies to select the lowest bidder
for many contracts and do not allow more open contracting processes. This
inhibits the ability to differentiate contractors on dimensions other than price.
Procedural limitations, such as requiring work to go to the lowest responsible
bidder, are statutory in Oregon. They probably reflect legislative interest in
documented fairness in contracting processes, provide a documented
transaction trail for accountability, and honor the public sector's own often
well-founded aversion to risk. Accordingly, we did not find a strong case for
a wholesale cutting of "red tape" and the encouragement of the adoption of
private-sector contracting practices. Private sector practices can be more
agile, and trust and relationships between individuals can often stand in lieu
of detailed documentation and procedure required by government.
Contracting is an area where there are differences that reflect the legitimate
difference in the cultures of government and the private sector.
There are hallmarks of successful contracting programs. Some of the key
themes that came to our attention are discussed below.
Be clear on outcomes. Contracts get into trouble when there is a lack of
clarity about the desired result. Ben Hayllar, director of finance in
Philadelphia asks, "If you can't do the job, how can you tell the contractor
what to do? How can you write a scope of services when you are clueless?"
Clarity about outcomes and results is more important than details about
means that in many cases might be left to the contractor. While the contractor
might usefully be encouraged to negotiate concerning outcomes, as was the
case in Atlanta, problems result when contractors are permitted to define
outcomes through performance.
Tie payments and other incentives to performance. Yes, it is true that a
contractor who has competitors has incentive to perform well, but it is also
desirable to build incentives into contracts themselves. Portlanders were
impressed in 1997 with the speed of the 1-5 Columbia River Bridge repair
where the contractor beat the projected completion time by a wide margin to
win early completion incentive awards. Incentives can be highly motivating
to the contracting community. On the other hand, we learned that there are
often objections to the addition of incentives in public contracts on the theory
that the contractor is being paid to perform and should not get extra public
dollars to do so.
Acknowledge that contracts can fail and be prepared to resolve a
failure. Be clear about what will occur if contract terms are not met, who
will be responsible, and what corrective actions will apply. Address bonds,
warranties, liability and proper indemnification.
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Acknowledge that conditions may change and be prepared to respond
to changes. What is almost certain is that the future will bring surprises.
While it is helpful to anticipate possible changes in conditions in the contract,
it is also useful to provide flexibility to respond to unanticipated changes.
Protect public policy preferences. It may be that for public policy reasons
a jurisdiction wishes to impose conditions on a contractor concerning a
deeply held policy preference. For, example, one interviewee felt very
strongly that government should not create lower paying jobs by moving
government work out for performance by contractors whose employees were
paid less than comparable government employees.
Have the capacity to monitor and evaluate performance. Even if
contractors perform the work, government still needs to know if performance
is satisfactory. Monitoring contract performance must be ongoing and should
track the contract schedule, milestones, and budget. Regular meetings with
the vendor and mid-course progress reports are essential. The auditing
approach should be tailored to the type of contract. In some cases,
quantitative information will be sufficient. In other areas, social services for
example, it may be necessary to gather more qualitative information through
face-to-face interviews. A contractor's willingness and ability to work closely
with service recipients to effectively meet each individual's needs should be
an important criterion in evaluating the quality of these services. In every
case, the contract should make clear the standards and expectations for
evaluation.
Nurture competitive incentives. The point of much contracting out—
particularly under a full marketization strategy in which the government
work force can bid against outside vendors for some work—is to benefit from
the competitive incentives of the marketplace. Unusually long contracts, or
contracts with onerous cancellation penalties, can deny government the
benefits of a competitive marketplace. Completely abandoning the ability to
perform work in-house also weakens the competitive incentive for the vendor
to perform. Certainly there are trade-offs. Longer-term contracts protect
vendors from competition, but on the positive side also permit the
government's avoided cost—the cost the vendor must better—to rise,
approaching the fully allocated cost.
"Time is money"—Public contract management should be as efficient
as possible. Even though government has valid reasons for its procedure
and process, recognize that greater agility in making decisions, paying bills,
negotiating changes and so forth would make government more attractive as
a client. Agility—simply recognizing that in the private sector time is
money—may make a greater number of vendors available to government and
can improve competition. While some of government's "red tape" is
necessary, some is not and should be pruned away.
Negotiation of means and ends can be a good way to tap vendor
creativity. The Atlanta example suggests that the public sector culture can
tolerate more structured negotiation concerning the means and deliverables
35
than is generally the case in public procurement processes where the request
for proposals often specify the deliverables and the means to create them as
well.
V. Findings—ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.
Next we offer several " case studies" that illustrate key points about
contracting out and marketization strategies.
The first case study provides some detail about private prisons, an area that
is already part of the public policy discussion in Oregon. The second is about
growing privatization of municipal water services, an area that is still over
the horizon for Oregon, but which merits attention. The last case study is
about not-for-profit social services agencies, an area where even the most
enthusiastic proponents of contracting out will agree that it is difficult if not
impossible to use contracting out or marketization to bring competitive
incentives to bear.
A. Private prisons—a ripe issue in Oregon
The first proponent of private prisons was Jeremy Bentham. In his 1791 book,
Panopticon, he proposed a circular prison structure designed for maximum
visibility—so that prisoners and their guards might be easily observed from a
central "Inspector's Lodge." Given this open architecture, he wrote " I would
do the whole thing by contract."
Private corrections are not new in practice. There were private prisons in the
United States in the last century. But the marked expansion of the private
sector into corrections began to generate interest and much controversy in the
mid-1980s. Underlying the recent expansion of private prisons are two
seemingly contrary trends. On the one hand, voters have lost patience with
criminal behavior and incarceration rates have risen; but, on the other hand,
voters have shown no enthusiasm for paying for extra prison beds.
Corrections is one of the fastest-growing state budget items, according to a
1998 report of the Reason Foundation. In the last 15 years, state spending on
corrections grew more than 350 percent—compared to a 250 percent increase
in spending on welfare and a 140 percent increase in spending on education.
More than a third of the states devote 5 percent or more of their revenue to
corrections—Oregon spends 7 percent.
Despite the increased spending, 19 state prison systems are 25 percent or
more over capacity and at least 10 others could be considered very
overcrowded. Some 800 jurisdictions have identified the need for new prison
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construction in the next few years. Nonetheless, voters are digging in,
approving fewer than half of the referenda to authorize bond financing for
new facilities.
The pressure to hold costs in the face of an increasing prison population has
opened the door to private corrections. Private corrections companies claim
they can cut between 10 percent and 40 percent off prison construction costs
because they can proceed with greater speed and agility and are not
hampered by the internal red-tape confronting the government. Although
cost claims may be debated, what is certain is that having a private firm build
and own the facility is politically more palatable for public officials not
wishing to put a bond measure for a public facility before the voters. Political
convenience may drive some decisions that are publicly justified in terms of
expected cost savings.
In addition to savings in up-front construction costs, private contractors
claim that they can operate prisons for 10 to 15 percent less than the
government. Many privately operated prisons are government owned.
Currently about 15 firms operate adult corrections facilities in the United
States. The largest of the prison companies is Corrections Corporation of
America (CCA), which operates over half the private prison beds in the
country. This company's services include design, construction and operation
of correctional facilities. The company is the industry leader with 62,487 beds
in 77 facilities in the US, Puerto Rico, Australia and the UK. Standard and
Poor's expects CCA's earnings to grow at a 40 percent pace fueled by an
aggressive facility opening program and "the trend toward privatization of
U.S correctional institutions...." In California, CCA is building a $100 million
dollar facility at California City even though the company has no contract
with the state. " If we build it, they will come." says CCA president Dave
Myers.
How do private firms hold down costs?
Reduction of labor costs is the primary source of operational savings claimed
by private contractors. When they have a hand in facility design, they will
provide for sight lines and technology that permit fewer people to monitor
prisoners. Private prisons are reported to use roughly one-third the
administrative staff present in public prisons. Overtime and sick time are
more carefully managed and private firms often have greater freedom to
manage personnel. Proponents say pay is "nearly the same or slightly lower"
but that private firms can employ a wider range of incentives including
promotion based on merit rather than seniority.
A second money saving strategy is "incident reduction." Nearly every
incident between inmates or between inmates and correctional officers costs
money. Private firms have a strong incentive to manage facilities to minimize
incidents. Proponents say this means keeping inmates well fed and occupied
with work, education, or recreation as well as establishing and maintaining
tight control.
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Full utilization of facility capacity is also key to a money-making strategy.
Beds not used by prisoners from the local jurisdiction can be made available
to other jurisdictions.
Lastly, proponents argue that private firms, unencumbered by government
purchasing regulations, are more efficient at purchasing supplies. They also
argue that private contractors maintain facilities with greater efficiency. For
example, public sector managers who deal with budgets from one
appropriation to the next may have difficulty getting funds for major capital
investments that will save money over time. Private contractors can look at
the numbers without having to worry about the daunting task of instructing a
legislature on the long-term benefits of capital improvements.
There are now 120 private facilities in 25 states, the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico. Oregon does not have a private prison, although it has dealt
with overpopulation by placing some female inmates in contract beds in
other states. The legislature has held interim hearings on the subject, but the
governor and the Department of Corrections have remained neutral on the
issue. Although no bill was available for examination, one legislative leader
of the movement to encourage private prisons in Oregon said she hopes to
introduce a bill in the 1999 legislative session that would require that one of
Oregon's next medium security prisons be private. She believes having at
least one private facility will provide an opportunity for competing
approaches, which, if successful, could be adopted by the publicly-operated
system as well as by future private prisons. Her theme was not that private is
necessarily better, but that controlled competition is better than the existing
public monopoly on prisons.
With so many jurisdictions opting for privatization isn't the case for prison
privatization clear cut? Not necessarily. Here is a sampling of the issues and
available information.
On the question of whether private corrections programs are cheaper than
public programs, the jury, for many observers, is still out. There are limited
"apples-to-apples" comparisons, and the conclusions drawn from them are
mixed.
In August 1996, the federal government General Accounting Office (GAO)
released its report "Public and Private Prisons—studies comparing
operational costs and/or quality of service." The GAO report assessed the
then-extant studies, rejecting some because of concern about the validity of
methodology or the appropriateness of the institutions being compared. But
three of the studies (California, Tennessee, and Washington) made
comparisons of costs between reasonably matched private and public
facilities that were operating within each state that was studied. Of the four
public-private comparisons reported in these studies, two showed no
significant difference in operational costs, one showed a seven percent
difference in favor of the private facility, and the other reported the private
facility to be more costly than one public institution and less costly than
another. "We could not conclude from these studies that privatization of
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correctional facilities will not save money. However these studies do not offer
substantial evidence that savings have occurred." The GAO concluded that
the studies they had examined offered little generalizable guidance for other
jurisdictions regarding potential cost savings.
In 1996, the State of Washington Legislative Budget Committee "Department
of Corrections Privatization Feasibility Study—Report 96-2" stated "Although
there are numerous published sources that debate the pros and cons of
privatization, there are only a few studies that have attempted to compare
costs, and they have reached conflicting conclusions." The report's authors
concluded that they did not find any studies from which they could draw
general conclusions about the potential for cost savings through the
privatization of prisons.
Both the Washington State and GAO studies have drawn fire from
proponents of private prisons. The GAO, possibly because of its institutional
credibility and the fact that the agency is frequently cited by skeptics, has
attracted the most criticism from proponents of private prisons. Proponents
argue that the GAO missed an "apples-to-apples" comparison of public
versus private prisons in Louisiana that shows 14-percent to 16-percent
savings in favor of private prisons. More generally, the GAO is criticized for
being too pristine to be of practical use. The GAO attempted to find "apples
to apples" comparisons of actual costs in similar comparable situations.
Analysts who are willing to make adjustments to account for differences in
prisons that are not alike or who are willing to compare actual costs of
private (or public) prisons with estimates of what it would have cost to have
a public (or private) prison, have had more data to work with than did the
GAO. Adrian Moore, a private prison proponent writing for the Reason
Foundation, found 14 independent studies, 12 of which found private prison
costs to be lower than government prison costs by from five to 28 percent.
In his book, Privatization Decision—Public Ends, Private Means (1989), John
Donahue concluded that "...there is enough room for variation in the
selection of samples, choice of methodologies, and the definition of quality
and efficiency to assure that consensus remains elusive. It seems likely that
even many years' experience with private prisons could still leave us without
unassailable evidence on efficiency, cost, or quality." Although a decade has
passed since Donahue made this observation, reasonable people continue to
debate this issue.
Some skeptics who concede initial savings are concerned with the durability
of savings offered by contractors bidding for new business. Contracts in this
business tend to be long-term—twenty or thirty years—and some require
compensation if canceled prematurely. Once in the embrace of a long-term
contractual relationship, a jurisdiction may no longer benefit from
competition in the industry even if it is vigorous. The contractor has
incentives to pass through cost increases, but has no incentive to share
savings with the government. Author John Donahue writes, "Nobody expects
the prison industry to be competitive in the way that the fast food industry is
competitive. But there is some reason to fear that instead of being competitive
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like the trash collection industry, it will be competitive like the nuclear
submarine industry—which is to say, not at all."
In addition to cost questions, there are many operational and philosophical
issues. Many of these issues flow from the suspicion that the profit motive
will lead corrections contractors to do inappropriate things. The list of
possibilities is long, but according to the Oregon Department of Corrections
there is no evidence to date that the quality of private operations suffers
when compared to government run facilities.
Oregon corrections officials note that voters here have given special weight to
having prisoners work or engage in on-the-job training. In 1994, Oregon
voters passed Measure 17 requiring inmates of state correctional institutions
to spend forty hours per week working or engaging in on-the-job training.
Currently the state has managed to put only 60 percent of inmates in the
required "industries" program. Administrators in Oregon point out that 95
percent of prisoners return to society and 77 percent of all female prisoners
return to parenting roles. They take Measure 17 as evidence that voters here
understand that there is much more involved than minimizing the costs
during incarceration. Although they are carefully neutral on the question of
whether private prisons are a good idea for Oregon, they are concerned
about the ability of contractors to manage with this larger picture in mind.
Contracts for prison services are necessarily complex and require careful
monitoring. With some public services, the government can be concerned
only with the outcome and not concerned with how the contractor performs
the service. But with prisons, the details of how the services are performed
are of interest to the government. Prisoners have rights. The government may
have objectives for prisoner rehabilitation and training. How the job is done
on a daily basis is a public concern. There are a number of functions that
relate to the time a person spends in prison, such as prisoner classification,
which cannot be delegated away to a contractor.
In addition, there are many legal issues, because law has evolved with the
presumption that prisons will be public facilities. Many of these can be
clarified by the state legislature, but some cannot. For example, the United
States Supreme Court has ruled that the limited immunity enjoyed by
government employees does not apply to contractor employees such as
private prison guards. Opponents suggest, then, that privatizing prisons
increases the government's ultimate exposure to prisoner lawsuits.
Proponents of private prisons say the Supreme Court decision creates strong
incentives for private prison personnel to behave correctly, incentives that are
lacking in the public system where employees enjoy limited immunity.
The issues are not insurmountable, but they are very complex, making
successful implementation of a private prison program challenging.
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B. Local water systems—an issue just over the horizon for
Oregon.
Drinking water and wastewater treatment are classic municipal services,
usually provided by local government itself. Eighty-five percent of drinking
water and 95 percent of wastewater treatment are provided directly by
government. But these two markets are opening up to private providers. One
witness characterized the market as being "where cable TV was 15 years
ago."
Privatization is most frequently stimulated by the need to expand or modify
the physical plant, often to meet environmental requirements. The United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that $138 billion of
drinking water infrastructure investments and more than $137 billion of
wastewater treatment investments are needed to meet system rehabilitation
and expansion needs. The EPA has encouraged municipalities to consider
public-private partnerships to finance these infrastructure needs. Standard
and Poor's reports that "[a] drive toward privatization is beginning to sweep
through this industry, due to a rising need for capital to repair or replace
aged facilities." Nonetheless, Standard and Poor's advises that "growth in the
industry is likely to be slow."
There are six major private entrants, along with a number of smaller
competitors. The big players are large, well capitalized, and in some cases
international. United Water Services, the second largest U. S. operator,
privatized the Indianapolis waste water system and is the North American
operating entity for Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, which operates in 130
countries. UWS operates in 13 American states. Its contracts typically
guarantee savings to the municipality. UWS guaranteed 34-percent savings to
Indianapolis (where independent auditors had declared the municipal
operation to be well run) and 56-percent savings to Atlanta over a ten-year
period. Our witness from UWS stressed the strong financial condition of the
company—illustrated by the company's "A" credit rating—but conceded that
to date "my company is in the red."
It is clear that the cities that are guaranteed savings realize them. It was not
clear to us that the private companies actually reduce the costs by the
amounts of the guarantees they make to cities. The market is just opening up,
and big players who can afford "loss leader" deals are jockeying for position
so it may be that some of the savings to cities represent real cost reductions
along with the buying of market share by the big companies. Nonetheless, the
possibilities for reducing costs and making money are drawing seasoned
companies into the American water and wastewater market. There is
something there, at least over the long term. Companies favor 10- to 20-year
contracts.
The production of drinking water and the processing of wastewater are
essentially manufacturing operations where costs should be easy to measure
and cost control should be straightforward. How do private companies do it
for less? We were told that long-run savings came from labor efficiencies.
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Typically, contracts have "no-layoff" provisions but savings come from
attrition over time. The big companies can also cut advantageous deals on
energy costs since they operate in more than one jurisdiction and have
greater market presence than a single city might. UWS also cited "know-
how" as important. While a city operates only one system, UMS operates
many and can examine its entire portfolio of operations for "best practices,"
and depend on its own potentially greater body of expertise.
Where a private contractor also builds a new facility, it is possible that public
decision-makers are attracted to the possibility of building without facing the
voters for a bond issue. The public still pays the cost through water and
sewer bills but doesn't vote on the capital improvement financing up-front.
Historically, the most prevalent form of privatization has been operations
assistance, where specific functions, "collections" for example, might be
contracted out on a one-to-three year contract. The market has now moved to
contract operations of an entire existing facility or system, usually under a 10-
to 20-year contract. The city still owns the plant and pays for repairs.
Prospectively, it is likely that more new facilities will be designed, built, and
operated by private firms.
C. Not-for-profit social service providers—not every area is
fertile ground for contracting out or marketization.
Non-profit agencies provide an often bewildering array of social services,
many of which are geared to the needs of specific populations unique to
particular geographic areas—even neighborhoods—within a given
governmental jurisdiction. Social service programs deal with disabilities,
physical and mental health, alcoholism, drug addiction, parenting skills, job
training, employment and the many other needs of typically poor or
otherwise disadvantaged persons. Human needs do not lend themselves to
uniformity or even comparability of services that may be vital for one
population and largely irrelevant for another. Multnomah County has over
three hundred non-profit contractors serving various social service niches.
Witnesses indicated that contracting out decisions for providing social
services are more often driven by proposals from the potential service
providers or by negotiations between private agencies and government
rather than by governments' requests for proposals inviting relatively similar
providers to submit competitive bids.
Typically, social agencies have come into existence "from the ground up,"
because of needs perceived by an individual or group that undertakes to
meet them by some combination of private donations and volunteers. The
1960s' War on Poverty further encouraged formation of grass-roots agencies.
Having started with limited resources, non-profits tend to pay their
employees less, and provide fewer benefits, than public employers,
sometimes resulting in excessive turnover, according to the agency
representatives we interviewed.
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The low labor costs are a disincentive to prospective private for-profit
competitors who would be expected to pay their employees at rates
approximating the prevailing wage and therefore could not provide
comparable services as cheaply. In addition, some states have laws that
prohibit for-profit companies from competing and also exempt social services
from the competitive bidding processes applied to other government
services.
Once established and shown to have community support, non-profit agencies
then propose to government that their services be funded so they can be
provided to a larger population or coordinated with other services already
available within that government's jurisdiction.
If a particular need is already being met, there is no incentive to form another
agency to compete with those already established—the "Yellow Pages Test,"
referred to above, does not apply to non-profits. One witness observed that
when government went out to bid, it was common to get just one offer.
In the absence of competition, contracting out services to non-profit
providers may simply replace a government monopoly with a private one.
Moreover, in the human services field, even if other providers could be
found, a change is likely to be far more disruptive to service recipients than a
change in the provider of a service with more clearly defined results such as
garbage removal or water treatment. Thus there may be policy reasons for
setting different selection criteria for providers of social and human services.
As one writer notes, "If social service contracting is a child of the
privatization movement, with its reverence for competition, it is a prodigal
child. Virtually no one directly involved in the social service system—
government, contractor or client—has any incentive to disrupt the system
once it is established." Nothing in our interviews refuted this comment.
Moreover, since quality of social services is far less measurable than that of
more concrete services, how could governments ascertain whether a change
would result either in better services or in getting services of comparable
quality at less cost?
Accountability can be a problem when there are a large number of niche
providers of difficult-to-measure services. It is further complicated when
contractors are receiving funds from multiple sources, each having its own
procedural and reporting requirements. One source characterized social
service contracting as often "laden with a morass of regulations." Witnesses
acknowledged that tracking clients through such non-profit social service
networks is difficult. Governments often cannot determine what works and
what does not; and in one case, Multnomah County knew where it sent the
checks but had lost track of where services were being provided.
Nonetheless, we found government social services directors pleased to be
able to contract with non-profits. One official said that we have lost
accountability, but we have captured motivated concern for the clients. We
did hear that many service providers make use of the resulting flexibility to
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provide services tailored to the specific and complex needs of the people they
serve.
The Multnomah County official who oversees the county's contracts with
human service providers reported that in the past the county used a block
grant approach—contractors told the county, "Tell us the desired outcome,
and leave it to us how to get to that outcome.. .we will self police and
monitor our own programs." The county was criticized for the difficulty it
had in monitoring its contractors and holding them accountable under this
system. The county has recently embarked on a new strategy, in which it
plans to contract with single non-profit providers for a range of services. A
contractor can either provide all the services itself or can subcontract with
other providers. The county's initial attempt to use this approach to
consolidate the provision of homeless youth services in the county was
unsuccessful because no contractor was interested in taking on this role. The
county currently is developing seven master contracts for the delivery of the
bulk of its anti-poverty services and non-clinical children, youth, and family
services. These contracts would consolidate services currently provided
through fourteen family centers and community action agencies. The
county's intent with this new approach is to increase both efficiency and
service quality.
There is comfort that networks of non-profit providers, even if difficult to
monitor or control, are well motivated. Flexibility was cited as a major
advantage offered by contracting with non-profits. Some non-profits have
changed their names, merged with other agencies, and /or modified their
menus of services offered, in order to respond to perceived changes in
community needs or in the availability of contract funds. Local government
officials state that, having once set up a tightly organized in-house network
for providing services, they find it difficult to change.
Given the complexities of social service contracting, we might have expected
to find a preference for keeping these services in-house. In fact, however, the
choice varies according to the circumstances that prevailed when a given
county set up a particular service. While Multnomah County relies
extensively on non-profit contractors, Clackamas County provides many of
the same services, such as mental health, using its own employees. We were
told that Clackamas County's decision to keep key services in-house was
based pragmatically on the fact that the county did not have the array of
established private agencies that exist in its more urban neighbor. Its Human
Services Director commented that she might well have made the same choice
as Multnomah, had there been comparable resources available.
Notwithstanding this objection, Clackamas County cites efficiencies in being
able to coordinate in-house programs and sees Multnomah County's
contracted services as fragmented.
The Reason Foundation, a usually-vigorous proponent of privatization,
acknowledges in one of its publications that the cost savings, efficiency gains,
and service improvements associated with the contracting of many
government services are not likely in the world of small social services
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providers. Other privatization approaches such as vouchers may hold greater
promise. Vouchers would permit clients, rather than governments, to "vote
with their feet" when another non-profit agency exists that they believe can
meet their needs more effectively than their present one. Agencies that are
about to fall below a critical mass of clients would then have an incentive to
change or upgrade their services, merge with agencies that clients find
effective, or go out of business entirely.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our exploration of public sector contracting out and marketization strategies
led us to a number of conclusions.
1. Incentives—not contracting out per se—are what counts.
Contracting out is as old as the Republic and nearly every unit of government
contracts out something. The most frequently stated reason is that it saves
money.
Recently the focus has shifted from contracting out per se, to incentives. And
the focus on incentives has led to the conclusion that a government work
force—properly incented—can be competitive with outside vendors. This has
given rise to a strategy called "marketization" in which existing government
employees are permitted to bid for work against outside providers.
To paraphrase the words of one City of Indianapolis employee, incentives
created by marketization invite employees to bring their best ideas to work.
2. Contracting out and "Marketization" in particular are
powerful strategies for reducing government costs.
Contracting out is the most common approach for taking advantage of
competitive forces. Where two or more vendors exist, government may be
able to enjoy the benefits of competition by contracting out work. And in fact,
it has long been common for governments to contract for printing, janitorial
services, automotive maintenance and other services for which there have
been is competitive markets. In recent years, private contractors have begun
to provide services traditionally provided by government such as corrections,
and municipal drinking and wastewater services. But, simply contracting out
does not guarantee that government will benefit from competitive incentives.
Our report documents the area of not-for-profit social service providers
where there are many contracts, but not much competition. And a private
monopolist may have even less incentive than government to control costs.
Contracting out works best when it brings competitive forces into play.
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Marketization permits existing public employees to bid on government
services against outside vendors. With a marketization strategy, some work
is contracted out, but other services are "contracted in" to government
employees. In the most mature example—the City of Indianapolis—services
deemed to be "ancillary"—printing, for example—are contracted out. But
other services, characterized as "core," where the city wishes to maintain
internal competence, are offered to both external, private sector bidders and
internal, public agency bidders. For example, the city established trash
collection districts. Both city workers and private vendors bid on the
contracts to service those districts. The result was that some districts are
served by private contractors and others are served by public employees. The
City of Indianapolis not only benefits from competition at the time the
contracts are negotiated, but can continue to compare performance from
district to district.
We found many examples where contracting out or marketization produced
significant savings. We were particularly impressed with the conclusions of
some jurisdictions that even well run public services, in which there were no
apparent opportunities for improvement, found ways to reduce costs and
improve service when exposed to competition. Incentives unlock ideas
known to the people who do the work, ideas that are often invisible within an
organization's budgeting, auditing, and other formal management systems.
3. Oregon jurisdictions lag in the adoption of marketization
and pro-active contracting strategies.
In Oregon, as elsewhere, a great deal of government work is contracted out.
But in general, the status quo prevails unless a crisis stimulates consideration
of a change. Work that has been traditionally contracted out by a jurisdiction
continues to be contracted out. Work done in-house, continues to be done in-
house.
We encountered some jurisdictions that have adopted formal philosophical
statements stating preferences for contracting out. However, we did not
encounter any Oregon jurisdiction with a proactive screening program
directed at identifying candidate services for contracting out.
We found one instance of a city department in Oregon that was proposing a
test of marketization—in which city employees would compete with outside
vendors. With this modest exception, we did not find any examples in
Oregon of jurisdictions or individual public agencies with marketization
strategies.
We found one city department that was itself a contractor to other
jurisdictions and provided printing and communication services in
competition with other vendors. Management believed costs were more
effectively managed because the department could achieve economies of
scale and served clients who had some freedom to select other providers.
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There has been interest in the Oregon Legislature in authorizing the
development of at least one private prison in Oregon and in contracting out
some Department of Environmental Quality automobile inspection functions.
The legislature has not passed any legislation to this effect, and the executive
branch has been neutral on contracting out these services.
4. Jurisdictions with a top down commitment from political
and executive leaders are the most likely to enjoy significant
benefits from competitive incentives.
Political and executive leadership are essential. Little will be accomplished in
their absence.
The proposed state-wide initiative, self-named "The Efficiency in
Government Act," would, if enacted by voters in the 2000 election, require
government to accept bids meeting certain price criteria. We do not believe
taking management strategy out of the hands of management is a
prescription for success. Indeed, the evidence we found indicates that the
most impressive successes occur not only where government management is
engaged but where line employees are fully involved as well.
5. All public sector activities should be evaluated against
formal screening criteria.
The most successful marketization programs periodically evaluate all of their
activities against formal screening criteria. The screening process identifies
activities that (1) should be provided by government directly; (2) activities
that should be contracted out; and (3) those that might be marketized—
meaning government employees and outside vendors could compete to do
the work. Screening criteria may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
depending on local values. What is important is that there be explicit criteria
and that political leadership support a genuine screening process.
We conclude that the following are among the most useful criteria for the
initial screening of activities for either contracting out or for marketization.
• Policy or implementation: Policy activities are not good candidates for
contracting but a wide range of implementation activities invite
contracting.
• Competition: Are there two or three prospective outside bidders? Can the
work be structured and can contracts be written that will nurture
competitive incentives?
• Cost: Is the fully allocated cost of the service 110 percent or more of the
price charged by vendors? The fully allocated cost is used for identifying
candidate services for further analysis. "Avoided cost"—never higher than
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the fully allocated cost and generally lower—is used for making a final
decision to contract or not.
• Ability to Evaluate Performance: It is easier to contract for services
where it is possible to evaluate the success of the contractor. Contracting is
difficult when it is not possible to define successful performance in writing
or to recognize it when it occurs.
The decision whether to simply contract out a service or to marketize it—
permit government employees to bid against outside vendors—will vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Many jurisdictions distinguish between
"core" services that government should retain an ability to perform (and
therefore could be marketized) and ancillary services, where government
should be comfortable relying entirely on the marketplace. Core services that
are not marketized for one reason or another are still candidates for
contracting out if other criteria are met. So-called "core" services such as
municipal water and fire protection have been successfully contracted out.
The fact that a program is performing well should not exempt it from being
marketized or contracted out. Contracting out and marketization are
strategies for reducing costs and improving performance—even of programs
that are not in trouble. Improved incentives improve performance.
6. Proper cost analysis is essential.
Political and executive leaders and public managers must understand which
costs are relevant for making contracting decisions. The government's
"avoided costs/' as described in this report, are the relevant costs to compare
with contractor prices. "Avoided costs" include subjective judgments
concerning which costs are in fact likely to be avoided if the government
contracts a service. It is unlikely that good analysis (and therefore good
decisions) will flow from rigid formulas imposed on managers. The route to
good cost analysis involves effective education, training and executive
leadership.
The proposed initiative, "The Efficiency in Government Act," is an example
of an approach that would impose a detailed and inappropriate cost analysis
formula on government managers. The measure's proposed cost analysis
formula would make it easier for contractors to gain government business
but, in our judgment, would have the unfortunate effect of increasing costs to
the taxpayer.
Because the complete costs of a government service—the so called "fully-
allocated costs"—are the beginning point for the analysis of decisions on
contracting, accounting systems should provide managers with fully-
allocated cost information. Even when services are not contracted out or
marketized, their fully-allocated costs can be compared to services in other
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jurisdictions or simply evaluated in the light of common sense.
7. Existing employees should be engaged in the planning
and implementation of strategies to either increase
contracting out or marketize services.
In Indianapolis, Mayor Goldsmith came into office with the intent to contract
out a number of city services. He quickly discovered that he avoided
employee opposition—and in fact benefited from employee initiative—by
including employees in the discussion. What began as a contracting-out
strategy, became a marketization strategy. With proper incentives and given
the flexibility to modify organization and work practices, public employees
reduced costs and improved performance.
Even jurisdictions limiting themselves to contracting out find it much more
effective when employees are engaged. Typically the public workforce is
reduced by normal attrition, transfers to other opportunities within
government or by offering employees new careers with the contractor. For
example, many of the employees and leading executives in the private prison
industry are former public employees.
8. Several areas merit further study by City Club.
We were frustrated at times by the broad nature of our charge that asked us
to address the general issue of contracting out but did not direct us to study
in depth any particular jurisdiction or program. Nevertheless, we did
examine several areas in sufficient depth to conclude that further City Club
study is merited.
The non-profit social service sector: We were impressed with the
limitations of marketization and contracting as management strategies in the
not-for-profit social services sector. At the same time, we were not
comfortable with the idea suggested by some witnesses that non-profit social
service contractors merit limited oversight because their motivations are
presumed to be congruent with those of the government. We are not
persuaded that being not for profit confers any special immunity against
failure or incompetence.
Accordingly, we believe a future City Club committee could usefully
evaluate the management of not-for-profit social services programs in
Multnomah County and elsewhere and draw conclusions and develop
recommendations concerning the management of these types of programs.
Private Prisons: This issue is ripe in Oregon. Because of the general nature of
our charge, we did not get into this issue deeply enough to make a definitive
recommendation concerning whether or not Oregon should join the states
with private prisons. But we do conclude that the argument that Oregon
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would benefit from having one of its next prisons constructed and operated
as a private facility is very plausible. Substantial national experience exists to
draw on. The evidence suggests that the state could benefit significantly and
is unlikely to slide backwards by bringing a private facility into its prison
system. Even if the Oregon Legislature decides to authorize a private prison
during the current session, before a City Club committee could complete its
report, implementation would be years away and the debate is likely to
continue. We believe a City Club study directed specifically at the question of
whether Oregon should join the states with private prisons would be a
significant contribution to this debate in Oregon.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on our conclusions, we make the following recommendation:
All Oregon public policy decision makers and political leaders should
actively examine how marketization policies could most effectively be
used in their jurisdiction.
Marketization permits public employees to bid on some of the government's
work; other work is contracted out; and some functions—policy setting, for
example—are performed directly by government. We wanted to say that all
Oregon jurisdictions should "adopt" rather than "actively examine"
marketization, but we are aware that success is unlikely where leadership is
not committed. We do not believe the acceptance of marketization will be
helped by jurisdictions that give it only lip service. Successes, particularly
early successes, are important. And for these, committed leadership is
essential. Our recommendation, then, is directed to Oregon political leaders
and senior public managers, asking that they "actively examine"
marketization as a public management strategy. We hope that among them
will be some willing to pioneer this strategy in Oregon government.
Marketization policies should have the following fundamental features:
• Screening criteria and a systematic screening process to identify which
services should be provided by government in the traditional way, which
services are candidates for marketization, and which services should be
contracted out.
• Employee involvement to give employees the incentives and flexibility to
show what they can do.
• Accounting systems that are modified, as resources realistically permit, to
provide reliable, fully-allocated cost information. Public managers and
decision makers should know the full costs of all services.
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Training and analytical assistance for public managers that helps them
make well-founded decisions concerning services to provide in the
traditional manner, services to contract out and services to marketize.
The use of "avoided costs"—not simply "fully allocated" costs—as the
basis for analyzing contractor bids.
Implementation that is strategic—picking easier opportunities first and
allowing time to learn from mistakes that may occur.
Monitoring and evaluation procedures to confirm that the marketization
strategy is producing results. The fact that a government is contracting,
either with an outside vendor or with an internal workforce, is in itself no
guarantee of results. It is important to assure that the strategy is in fact
working to nurture constructive incentives and that results are
satisfactory.
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